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Abstract 
Connected and automated vehicles (CAVs) represent a challenge for future 
transportation systems as they generate a massive amount of data which may also 
include security threats and vulnerabilities for users. In this paper, we adapt a model-
based systems engineering (MBSE) approach called the Internet of Things Security 
Modelling (IoTsecM) to address security challenges and system-level security critical 
issues in the domain of CAVs. Not only are connected and automated vehicles 
considered, but also their interactions with other assets such as roadside infrastructure, 
sensors and traffic lights. The application is based on a project which identified 
innovative solutions related to connectivity, data analytics and safe design for CAVs in 
the UK. The objective of introducing IoTsecM into the project context was to provide 
an MBSE method to develop a systems architecture where the security mechanisms and 
controls are identified and modelled during the requirements stage in order to facilitate 
secure, trustworthy and private CAV technology development by design. 
1 Introduction 
The Internet of Things (IoT) uses the internet to provide information transfer services, analytics, 
applications, and communications, meaning that more objects (e.g. cameras, wearables, 
environmental sensors, appliances etc.) are ‘connected’, generating massive amounts of data. The 
collection, integration, processing and analytics of that data enables the realization of smart 
environments, infrastructures and services for enhancing quality of life (Porter & Heppelmann, 2014). 
Connected and automated vehicles (CAVs) in particular are recognized as a smart-connected asset in 
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future transportation systems, with the IoT playing a key role in the connectivity and access of their 
multiple component systems (McCarthy et al., 2016). The network infrastructure collects data from 
the environment leveraging sensing capabilities and interacts with the physical world by performing 
actuation and command-and-control over other things (Rigazzi et al., 2017). 
However, as the number of entities connected to the internet grows, the security attacks surface 
grows too. IoT systems pose new challenges that were not present in the traditional internet. Security 
requirements of IoT systems are often considered as an after-thought, even when the information 
handled by those systems is sensitive (Conti et al., 2018). In particular, the risk of cyber-attacks 
directed to CAV applications can compromise the availability and integrity of passenger information, 
crippling mobility and even threaten passengers’ safety, if decisions are made based on invalid 
information (Baig et al., 2017; Woo et al., 2015). The vast amount of data and the considerable level 
of risk associated with CAV operations makes them a challenging area for security analysis. Much 
work is required to develop systems and methodologies for handling operational security 
requirements, while maintaining a high level of privacy for the individual users (FLOURISH, 2019).  
In this paper, we present a method for comprehensive analysis of the threats and risks associated 
with connected and automated vehicles and their potential impact on the transportation system. We 
adopt a model-based systems engineering (MBSE) approach called the Internet of Things Security 
Modelling (IoTsecM, Robles-Ramirez et al., 2017) and combine it with attack tree security analysis 
methodology to address security threats, vulnerabilities and system-level security critical issues. 
The following section 2 reviews the context of connected and automated vehicles, security threats 
and vulnerabilities and the role of IoT in CAVs and the transportation system. Section 3 provides an 
illustration of the approach’s use in the context of a real-world project aiming to design secure CAVs 
in the UK and addressing traffic safety, congestion, and user behavior. The final section concludes our 
work and explores further opportunities for CAV security research in the MBSE space. 
2 Background Work 
2.1 Technical Components Architecture and Threats 
Driverless vehicles generate large sets of data in the interconnected world. CAVs hold GPS and 
integrated infotainment systems, which can link to smartphones and to cloud computing (Samie et al., 
2016). Vehicles with GPS and traffic light sensors produce vehicle location data, while a vehicle 
follows a specific direction for the user and their travel. Many vehicles today use the united diagnostic 
services protocol (UDS) for diagnostics and interaction with the onboard diagnostics unit (OBD). The 
OBD communicates with Bluetooth and smartphone communication systems, which use the vehicle 
network to exchange data and contact the network control center (Woo et al., 2015). CAVs have also 
essential capabilities of recording and storing data. The event data recorder (EDR) records data such 
as speed variations, which can be associated with accident events (Mansor et al., 2016). For example, 
the electronic control units (ECUs) can record speed data or data related to a journey distance. Many 
driverless vehicles have also integrated EDRs which can even record personal data (e.g. the number 
of occupants in the vehicle, if they are identifiable). A lot of data collected from CAVs can be 
personal (e.g. geolocation, MAC address, user ID etc.) or depending on application, even more 
sensitive information (e.g. indicators of the physical or mental health of an occupant). They may also 
carry commercially sensitive data (e.g. intellectual property) or non-sensitive data (e.g. traffic 
congestion or speed). 
Data produced by CAVs may pose security challenges for the vehicle and its users. Data 
protection, safeguarding from physical damages, and any other threat and vulnerability is of high 
interest for a secure and trusted operation. These security concerns may stem from the following 
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sources: physical (e.g. side channel attacks to crack information), interception (such as man-in-the-
middle attacks), abuse (such as unauthorized access to the vehicle), malicious code (generic malicious 
code affecting the integrated infotainment system), data leaks (e.g. when the vehicle changes owner) 
etc. (Samie et al., 2016). All the above security threats are inextricably linked with the IoT, as it is the 
means by which the components identified above communicate, exchange data, decide, take actions 
and provide services, thus shaping the connected transportation ecosystem. 
In general, some of the key challenges for IoT in relation to security that also apply to CAVs 
include: a) naming and identity management, b) interoperability and standardization, c) information 
privacy, d) objects safety and security, e) data confidentiality and encryption, f) network security, g) 
spectrum allocation etc. (Khan et al., 2016). In the world of CAVs, IoT specifically applies to 
connecting sensors and vehicles to networks (McCarthy et al., 2016). Khan et al. (2016) refer to IoT 
sensors such as traffic congestion sensors that collect data and store them in cloud servers. Here some 
security threats are in particular: a) confidentiality and integrity; b) eavesdropping; c) data loss; d) 
availability compromise and e) remote exploitation.  
Therefore, in an interconnected environment where IoT is integrated with vehicles, vulnerabilities 
of embedded systems that can lead to cyber-attacks is a real concern with economic and physical 
implications. Addressing those cybersecurity issues is challenging because those systems are complex 
and with limited computational power (Samie et al., 2016). To ensure security, a comprehensive 
design and operation process is required. Model-based systems engineering with the extension of 
UMLsec is capable of incorporating a security viewpoint to the system (e.g. Jürjens et al., 2008; Oates 
et al., 2013; Apvrille & Roudier, 2016). In this paper we propose an approach which can be used to 
identify threats and vulnerabilities for CAVs early and help a designer to integrate security controls to 
the overall system. 
2.2 The FLOURISH Project 
CAVs will have significant impact in many aspects of our lives from a technological, social and 
economic perspective when becoming a reality. The United Kingdom aims to become one of the most 
considerable actors in the world of driverless vehicles, a goal with a prerequisite for a secure cyber 
environment (McCarthy et al., 2016). Integrity and clarity on sharing data, as well as the development 
of cybersecurity standards, will be fundamental to support the development of CAV technology. In 
this national context, FLOURISH (n.d.) was a multi-sector collaboration, helping to accelerate and 
promote the successful implementation of CAVs in the UK, by establishing services and capabilities 
that link user needs and system requirements. The project aimed to address cybersecurity threats and 
privacy issues by design, as well as explore user acceptance of CAVs. Assessing cyber risks is the key 
component for the protection of CAVs, but they are not an isolated system and so this is not a trivial 
task. CAVs operate within a more extensive network and a complex infrastructure. Also, exploring 
user-acceptance requires transparency on how CAVs use user data and how they are protected from 
cyber-attacks (FLOURISH, 2019). 
The main security threats that the project was concerned with were a) loss of control over the 
system as the result of cyber-attacks; b) damage or loss of technology assets (e.g. loss of data or 
damage caused by a third party); c) any abuse such as denial of service attack or unauthorized access 
to systems; d) information leakage or sharing, inadequate design and planning or lack of adoption of 
standards; e) failures or malfunctions (e.g. software bugs); f) information interceptions or network 
reconnaissance. Not only automated vehicles are considered, but also the interaction of these with 
other assets such as city infrastructure, sensors and traffic lights. 
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2.3 The IoTsecM Security Modelling Extension 
The main objective of threat modelling is to identify system vulnerabilities which could be 
exploited by a motivated attacker and understand how they could be exploited, if countermeasures are 
not implemented (Shostack, 2014). Once possible attacks over the system are identified, the developer 
is able to specify the required protection or countermeasures against those attacks. Threat modelling 
can be achieved in different ways, as there is no unique methodology. Various sources provide 
methods and tools for it, e.g. Microsoft proposes an approach which uses multiple steps to determine 
the severity of threats, the secure development lifecycle (SDL) (Shostack, 2014). 
For the requirement of security-by-design posed by the FLOURISH project, we explored the use 
of an MBSE approach to IoT security modelling that could serve the nature of the highly 
interconnected CAV components. We decided to adopt the IoTsecM approach (Robles-Ramirez et al., 
2017) that employs a UML/SysML extension nomenclature to consider security requirements along 
the analysis stage of a well-defined development life cycle, such as the waterfall model. Some of its 
nomenclature components have been previously proposed in the IoT-A proposalas security modules 
(M. Unis et al., 2013). However, they were not proposed as a UML/SysML extension. As such, 
IoTsecM provides a set of well-defined elements which abstract the security features of IoT systems 
and allows for them to be embedded in UML/SysML diagrams. 
Therefore, it is a notational representation which integrates security elements in a nomenclature 
and encapsulated in stereotypes. Such stereotypes are presented in Table I. Each one of the elements 
encapsulates an IoT security service, and has a short representation (nomenclature elements), the 
corresponding UML extension mechanism and the metaclasses extended by the element. These 
elements are used inside the extended UML/SysML diagrams because they are high level abstraction 
security requirements and they encapsulate the traditional ‘CIA’ security goals (i.e. confidentiality-
integrity-availability). 
The nomenclature can be applied as use cases, if the security requirements warrant it. In a class 
diagram, some nomenclature elements can be modelled as classes, and, in fact, according to the IoT 
security requirements analysis performed, some of these elements are: N, Z, C and D (as identified in 
Table I). The TP, SS and SC elements are constraints represented as [TP], [SS] and [SC], and these 
three elements are used mainly in the use case diagrams and in UML behavior diagrams. For example, 
the D (decryption requirement) and N (authentication) elements can also be modelled as use cases. 
This allows a more agile design process for security requirements, because even though developers 
are not necessarily involved in security analysis, they can still recognize these elements. 
 
Element Name Extension mechanism Base meta-class(es) 
N  Authentication  Stereotype  Class, use case, component, block, 
activity and state 
Z  Authorization  Stereotype  Class, activity, component, block, state and use case 
C  Cipher  Stereotype  Use case, component, block, class 
D  Decipher  Stereotype  Use case, class and component 
SS  Secure Storage  Stereotype  Link, property, association, communication path and constraint 
SC  Secure 
communication  
Stereotype  Constraint, communication path and 
link  
TP  Tamper protection  Stereotype  Constraint and property  
Table I: IoTsecM nomenclature 
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A sequence diagram depicts objects interactions chronologically, where the classes which apply 
the nomenclature appear in the diagram as objects. A potential attack will be ultimately modelled as a 
sequence diagram, having first been identified and understood in this analysis via the use of attack 
trees. Attack trees are one way to model attacker behavior against the system assets (Apvrille & 
Roudier, 2016). Normally, an attack is grouped in a sequence of sub-attacks or other activities that are 
individually focused on obtaining an immediate target. Attack trees let us model these sub-attacks and 
the steps that need to be followed to obtain the target. This attack representation helps to 
conceptualize, visualize, and communicate a better understanding of the vulnerabilities that could be 
exploited and then is can be easily translated to a sequence diagram embedded in the overall model. 
3 Model-based Cybersecurity Engineering for CAVs 
Many threats could undermine the FLOURISH architecture, given that CAVs are in constant 
interaction with their environment. They could become subject of interest to persistent and motivated 
attackers. The objective of introducing IoTsecM into FLOURISH was to provide an application 
architecture where the security mechanisms and controls are specified and modelled in order to enable 
secure, trustworthy and private technology development within CAVs and across the whole 
infrastructure (Rigazzi et al., 2017). The IoTsecM extensions provide a notation and semantics which 
model and depict the security requirements in the system architecture model. In this work we adopt 
the threat modelling approach originally described in (Robles-Ramirez et al., 2017). The approach 
was customized and extended in order to add the countermeasures modelling. The process followed is 
summarized into the following steps: 1) Identify the assets, 2) Create an IoT system architecture 
overview, 3) Decompose the IoT system, 4) Identify threats, 5) Document threats, 6) Propose counter-
measures for each threat, 7) Propose a system architecture with security countermeasures. 
 
Asset  Description  
LIDAR  It is a sensor located in strategic places and it creates BBR data (data monitored from other cars)  
CAVs  The connected and automated vehicles  
RSU  The roadside unit  
Carer  
Is the person dedicated to activating the point in order to establish 
a special zone which is a restriction zone for special requirements 
such as slow traffic  
Instructions data  It is the result data delivered by the control room and sent to CAVs through the RSU  
On board sensors  They are sensors located within the CAV mainly to monitor passengers  
Vehicle level AI unit  Artificial intelligence unit within the CAVs  
Autonomous control 
system  
The subsystem which carries out the CAVs control  
Table II: Flourish architecture components (assets) 
Assets are system components which are of interest to an attacker; they can be hardware, software, 
physical entities or even humans. Assets identification allows an understanding of what must be 
protected to mitigate the impact of threat. In the context of this study, the assets were obtained by 
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analyzing the scenarios provided by the FLOURISH team, who described each scenario as general 
system use-cases. The FLOURISH architecture involves automated vehicles communicating with 
each other and with human-driven vehicles (HDV) and to roadside units (RSU). This communication 
is referred to as V2X (vehicle to everything). The system architecture overview consists mainly of 
CAVs travelling around the city with potential passengers riding. The RSU is the communications 
hub that is strategically located to communicate key commands to the CAVs and link them to diverse 
processing centers. Therefore, the system architecture comprises three assets categories: a) CAV, b) 
RSU, and c) Processing nodes. Due to space constraints, only a few of the assets identified from the 
scenarios are shown in Table II. 
Once the assets were identified, the next step involved threat modelling as described earlier, to 
create a system architecture overview. The original system architecture is depicted as a UML class 
diagram in Figure 1. It contains the assets identified and their interconnections. There are the three 
main asset Categories of CAVs, RSU and intelligent transport systems (ITS) central station as 
discussed earlier. The architecture of the system incorporating security is proposed later in this 
section. 
Figure 1: Original FLOURISH data architecture 
CAVs hold onboard sensors, the vehicle level AI unit and the autonomous control, besides some 
attributes such as an ID and driving intensions (represented as a software module). The operations that 
the CAVs perform include:  feedBBR, receiveInstructions, broadcastDrivenIntensions, 
readManoeuvringActions and provideODinformation. Each one of these instructions corresponds to 
one functionality described in the scenarios, e.g. the broadcastDrivenIntensions operation correspond 
to the use case of maneuvering collaboration where CAVs must broadcast their driving intentions to 
other CAVs in order for them to correctly react to the new movements and even predict new driving 
intensions. The communication channel between CAVs and RSU may be achieved through two ways, 
the first one by 3G/4G connectivity and the second one by the ITSG5OBU standard. These two ways 
allow the CAVs to send and receive data from the RSU. 
The RSU operations include: readBBRdata, broadcastOptimalSpeed, broadcastBBR, 
broadcastTrafficControl, priorityWeight, deploymentVirtualBoxJunction and 
trafficSignalControlOptimisation. The principal RSU functionality is to receive information from the 
processing nodes and forward data to the CAVs. The operations correspond to the different kinds of 
data that the RSU must forward. The network AI unit is modelled with the NetworkAIunit class 
therefore, its operations correspond to the network AI unit behavior. The control room is modelled 
with the ControlRoom and its operations (controlAlgorithm, SendInstructions, givePriorityRoads and 
this section where the interactions a d sy t m assets appear tog ther conf rming the 
Flourish IoT system.  
The system architecture is depicted in UML class diagram, it considers the assets identified 
before and their connections. As it can be seen in Fig. 1 there are three main components 
within the architecture: CAVs, RSU and intelligent transport systems (ITS) central station.  
 
 
Fig. 1 Flourish architecture overview. 
 
The CAVs holds the on-board sensors, the vehicle level AI unit and the autonomous control, 
besides it contains some attributes such as an ID and its driven intensions. The operations 
that th  CAVs holds re: feedBBR, receiveInstructions, broadcastDrivenIntensions, 
broadcastMotionHDV, readManoeuvringActions, provideODinformation, avoidCongestion, 
receiveRoutingAdvisory and aggregateODInformation, each on  of these instructions 
corresponds to one functionality described in the scenarios, e.g. the 
broadcastDrivenIntensions operation correspond to the use case of manoeuvring 
collabor tion where CAVs must broadcast its driven int ntions to other CAVs in order for 
them to correctly react to the new movements and even predict new driven intensions. Due 
to confidentiality issues the scenarios are note completely described in this work. 
The communication channel between CAVs and RSU may be achieved through two ways, 
the first one is by 3G/4G technology and the second one is by the ITSG5OBU, which is 
related to the infrastructure proposed by the Flourish team, this two ways allow the CAVs 
to send and receive data from the RSU.  
The RSU opperations are: readBBRdata, broadcastOptimalSpeed, broadcastBBR, 
broadcastTrafficControl, priorityWeight, deploymentVirtualBoxJunction, 
trafficSignalControlOptimisation, forwardInformation2ControlNode, 
receiveSpecialZoneReq, receiveODinformation and forwardODinformation. The principal 
RSU functionality is to receive information from the processing nodes and forward data to 
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calculateCityCicles) are focused on give priority to certain roads and send instructions to the RSU. 
The Carer is the person who activates the special zone through the point dedicated to activating it. 
This asset is modelled by the Carer class and it includes one operation activatePoint. LIDAR is the 
asset which monitors the CAVs and HDV, it obtains and creates data about the movements. The 
operations defined for the LIDAR class are createBBRFeed and generateBBR.  
In order to facilitate the threat identification, an intuitive and graphic notation is needed, Attack 
trees diagrams are proposed to that effect. Attack trees are an orderly and sequential way of 
describing the sub-attacks to violate a system, they are a useful tool to conceptualize and visualize the 
possible attacks, allowing the analyst to create attacker profiles, in order to make decisions about the 
possible mechanisms and security controls needed to protect the system.  
We use ‘SecureItree’ for the threat surface analysis of the Flourish project. SecureItree is an attack 
tree modelling tool built by the Canadian company Amenaza (Spanish for threat) (n.d.). In this tool, 
the root node represents the end objective and the children nodes the different sub-attacks in order to 
accomplish the overarching goal. Nodes can be AND operators, OR operators, or a LEAF. The AND 
operator means that all of the children nodes are needed to accomplish the parent node. On the other 
hand, the OR operator means that any of the children nodes satisfy the parent node.  
Subsequently the security of the system can be analyzed through the application of various 
scenarios. Due to page limit constraints, only one such scenario is explored in this paper, as an 
illustration of the application of our approach. One particular concern is the threat associated with the 
‘Spoofing of BBR data’ (fig. 2). This is a situation where an attacker is able to falsify data, in this 
case the BBR data which is generated by the LIDAR sensor (BBR data falsification). We will use 
attack trees to model the attack and, in this case, the resulting structure involves the next sub attacks: 
• Tamper with the on-board sensors: The on-board sensors are manipulated to change the 
data readings in order to create false information and as a consequence change the CAV’s 
BBR data. The countermeasure is tamper-proof hardware and software for the on-board 
sensors. 
• Impersonate the CAV sensor node: Another way to change the BBR data from CAV is a 
man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack. If an attacker is able to impersonate the CAV sensor 
node, then it can receive and change the on-board sensors data. The countermeasure is the 
authentication of the on-board sensors.  
• Create a fake RSU: This attack is about creating a false RSU in order to perform a MITM 
attack, in this way the LIDAR would not be able to identify the false RSU, and it would 
share the BBR data. The countermeasure proposed against this attack is authentication of 
the RSU. 
• Create a fake processing node: The MITM attack here is deployed between the LIDAR 
and some of the processing nodes. The countermeasure proposed to mitigate this threat is 
the authentication of the LIDAR and a trusted processing node.  
• Tampering with the LIDAR: this attack is about physical tamper with the LIDAR, in 
order to change the data which is about to send. Countermeasures involves the use of 
tamper protection. 
Once the attack trees have been defined and countermeasures have been identified, it is time to 
specify where the latter have to be placed. The IoTsecM profile includes extensions to the use cases 
metaclasses. The first step is to identify which system actor carries out the security countermeasures 
identified. Therefore, according to the scenarios proposed by the FLOURISH team the use case 
diagrams for each scenario adding the security countermeasures are drawn.  
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Figure 2: Spoofing BBR data attack tree 
 
Figure 3: LIDAR scenario use-case diagram 
The scenario described here is about the LIDAR and its interactions with the CAV and RSU. It is 
worthy of noting that the use-case diagram in Fig. 3. and the accompanying text documentation are in 
tamper-proof for the on-board sensors, in this way the attacker which at this point 
has reached the sensors physically will not be able to perform the tamper attack. 
x Impersonate the CAV sensor node: Another way to change the BBR data from CAV 
is a man in the middle (MITM) attack. If an attacker is able to impersonate the CAV 
sensor node, then it can receive and change the on-board sensors data. Therefore, 
the countermeasure for this attack is the authentication of the on-board sensors, 
in order to guarantee that sensors are who they claim to be. 
x Create a fake RSU: This attack consists in create a false RSU in order to perform a 
MITM attack, in this way the LIDAR would not be able to identify the false RSU, 
would trust on it and it would share the BBR data. The countermeasure proposed 
against this attack is the authentication of the RSU, besides, a trust and reputation 
scheme would help a lot to mitigate this kind of attacks. 
x Create a fake processing node: It is very similar to the last attack. However, the 
MITM attack here is deployed between the LIDAR and some of the processing 
nodes. The countermeasure proposed to mitigate this threat is the authentication 
of the LIDAR and a trusted processing node. 
x Tampering into the LIDAR: The most despicable way to attack the system is to 
tamper the LIDAR, this means that a well-motivated attacker performs a physical 
tamper to the LIDAR, in order to change the data which is about to send. Because 
of this potential attack a tamper protection for the software and hardware is 
required in the LIDAR.  
 
Fig. 3 Spoofing BBR data attack tree. 
The first scenario described is about the LIDAR and its interactions with the CAV and RSU. 
The use case diagram related to this scenario is depicted in Fig. 8, for this and the text use 
cases the only use cases explained are the concerned to the security countermeasures 
identified. For this scenario the use cases identified are: 
 
 
Fig. 8 LIDAR scenario use case diagram. 
The use cas  conc rned to the co ntermeasures are prese ted in  tables 6 to 20, the tables 
comprises next fields: Use case name, participating actor, entry condition, flow of events 
and exit condition. 
Table  2 <<C>> use case for CAV, scenario 1 
Use case name:  
<<C>> Encrypts 
 
Participating actor:  
CAVs 
Entry condition: 
The CAVs receives data from RSU and authenticate and decipher them. 
Flow of events: 
The CAVs actor read the on-board sensors, 
It obtains the feed BBR data 
Encrypts them with the RSU public key and send them to the RSU. 
This use case extends the Feed BBR data (BBR+feed) use case 
Exit condition: 
The data package is signed and sentby the CAVs to the RSU 
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situations where they relate to the identified countermeasure. The use case relating to the 
countermeasures are presented in tables III.a and III.b. The tables comprise the following fields: Use 
case name, participating actor, entry condition, flow of events and exit condition.  
 
Use case name: <<N>> authenticates  
Participating actor: CAV 
Entry condition: An entry package is sent from 
RSU  
Events flow: The package is received. The CAVs 
actor runs the authentication element. The 
<<N>> element obtains the RSU credentials from 
the package. The <<N>> stereotype instance 
creates complementary information from de 
credentials. The <<N>> stereotype instance runs 
the authentication function. The <<N>> creates 
the assertion {True, False}. This use case extends 
the Receives RSU instructions use case and 
Receives data from RSU use case 
Exit condition: The CAVs authenticate the 
package received 
Table III.a: <<N>> authenticates use case for CAV 
Aside of the security use cases defined before, there are other constraints displayed on the use case 
diagram which are placed there to integrate more security concerns within the architecture. Also, there 
are two links identified as secure communications constraints. The links are the ‘Receives data from 
RSU’ and ‘send data to CAVs’ where the communication from RSU to the CAVs is established. The 
other Secure Communication ({SC}) constraint appears in the link between the LIDAR and the RSU. 
The LIDAR needs to be an authorized actor in order to be able to send data to the RSU. The RSU also 
needs to be authenticated, thus the “N” text box is placed over its head. The analysis of the 
countermeasures identified allows to specify the location where the security mechanism should be 
allocated. The use-case diagrams were very useful for security requirements conceptualization, as the 
IoTsecM extensions within the use case diagrams could represent each security countermeasure 
identified in the attack trees clearly.  
The next step was to propose a whole-system architecture, including both functional and the non-
functional elements in a class diagram. This helps to attend all the issues concerning to the 
interconnections between the assets, the identification of their operations and any relationships 
between the security mechanisms. The IoTsecM profile includes extension for classes, components 
and devices metaclasses, which assist the designing of the system architecture. In Fig. 4. the system 
architecture regarding the security elements is presented. The objective of the IoTsecM profile is to 
allow the designers to build, model and depict the security mechanisms together with the functional 
elements. As it can be seen in Fig. 4, security countermeasures identified are included in the system 
architecture. Here the CAV requires tamper protection and secure storage, besides requiring a 
pseudonym. 
As shown in the use cases, the CAV authenticates and monitors the entry data and the network, 
hence, the <<N>> stereotype is instantiated. Likewise, the RSU must contain the security 
countermeasures found. Therefore, the stereotype instantiated and associated to the RSU is <<N>>; 
besides as well as the CAV, the PPKI infrastructure is supported by the RSU, hence a tamper 
protection is placed as a requirement. IoTsecM allowed us to capture security requirements by 
applying the stereotypes described. Once threat analysis was concluded, the countermeasures were 
identified and integrated with the functional requirements through use case and class diagrams as 
Use case name: <<N>> RSU Authenticates  
Participating actor: RSU  
Entry condition: Receive data from the LIDAR  
 
Events flow: The package is received. The RSU actor 
runs the authentication element. The <<N>> element 
obtains the LIDAR credentials from the package. The 
<<N>> stereotype instance create complementary 
information from de credentials The <<N>> stereotype 
instance runs the authentication function. The <<N>> 
creates the assertion {True, False}. This use case 
extends the Read BBR data instructions use case. 
 
 
Exit condition: The RSU authenticates the package 
received.   
Table III.b: <<N>> use case for CAV 
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discussed here. The UML notation provided a better understanding of where the security 
countermeasures needed to be placed, which actor is associated to them and how they are related to 
other system assets. 
 
Figure 4: Re-engineered Flourish system architecture applying the IoTsecM profile 
4 Conclusions and Further Work 
The IoTsecM approach allowed to capture the security requirements by applying the UML 
stereotypes described earlier. Once threat analysis was performed, the countermeasures were 
identified and included in the design along with the functional requirements in use case and class 
diagrams. The UML notation provided a better understanding of where the security countermeasures 
needed to be placed, which actor is associated to them and how they are related to other system assets. 
In the future, this architectural view may be extended with behavioral diagrams where the use 
cases and objects actions are included, in order to understand the processes followed by them, besides 
their interaction. 
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Fig. 13 Flourish architecture applying the IoTsecM profile 
 
As it can be seen in the Fg. 47 the security countermeasures identified before are depicted 
in th  system architecture, the CAV require  a ta per pr tection and secure storage, 
besides it requires a pseudonym. As in the use cases was shown the CAV authenticates, 
authorizes, en rypt and decrypt besides it monitors th  entry data and the network, hence, 
the <<N>>, <<C>>, <<D>>, <<BM>> and <<Z>> stereotypes are instanced. 
The addition of other security elements such as CA, RA, IM and KM is because of the 
necessity of certificates to be issued and the pseudonyms requirements. All these elements 
conform a public key infrastructure (PKI), or in the case of the pseudonyms requirement, it 
is named pseudonym public key infrastructure (PPKI).  
The RSU must contain the security countermeasures found. Therefore, the stereotypes 
instanced associated to the RSU are <<N>>, <<C>>, <<D>>, <<BM>> and <<Z>>, besides as 
well as the CAV the PPKI infrastructure is supported by the RSU. A tamper protection is 
placed as a requirement.  
The security mechanisms for these processing nodes are modelled contained in a central 
station, the central station contains the stereotype instances <<N>>, <<C>>, <<D>>, 
<<BM>> and <<Z>>.  
The IoTsecM proposal allowed to depict the security concerns applying the stereotypes 
described before. Once threat analysis was performance, the countermeasures were 
identified and depicted with the functional requirements in use case diagrams and class 
diagrams. The UML notation provided a better understanding of where the security 
countermeasures needs to be placed, which actor is associated to them and how they are 
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